Loadpipe Community Town Hall 3: Tokenomics

Another 1.5-hour tokenomics call took place on Thursday, February 22, 2024, on our Loadpipe Discord channel. Here’s the full recording and transcript. Enjoy!


(00:02) so I’m not quite sure where to start I think maybe let’s just address some of the comments issue and actually I’m just going to call this we’re going to call this e-commerce protocol okay and and then so we’ll we’ll go through some of the comments and some of the things that have been added here and there and then we’ll dive into like this is sort of now our current architectural model there’s a little bit more on sort of how decision- making of how the tokenomics emit and we understand a little bit

(00:35) better where the the protocol actors sit and what they look like how they enter and yeah we’ve been talking a lot about like incentives and everything so so you can all Spotlight me and then we’ll we’ll just go around in order and so like I’ll just start with comments see here I don’t see your screen I not if you mean to share your screen but I don’t see it or do you want to no no no no so so I would say just go into the figma and then when you’re in the figma you can snap to my screen and you can

(01:06) follow me around as I as I as I go around and so so this is a this is I think one of the first comments and this was just like a general conversation about how we’re going to censor trans or I mean like products and so I think that that has been we we’ve sort of rethought about that and maybe we’ll get into this a little bit later but right now so we’ve been having an ongoing conversation with a developer who who’s building out a very very primitive like e-commerce protocol and the way he

(01:35) describes is it it’s tcpip so it just allows e-commerce transactions to happen and so and it creates vendors and database relays so a relay can be registered in their General protocol which will allow like product data to be stored in in sort of a decentralized relay Network marketplaces would operate their own versions of these relays Within our sort of like Marketplace down down a little bit ways and then vendors are also sort of like primary there’s two actors in This protocol there is a vendor and then there’s a relay and a

(02:13) vendor would then have to sign in and create their like social e-commerce profile with us right and this is the the protocol that we’ve been calling load pipe and then from and then they would again exist at this sort of higher level protocol level and then also just check into marketplaces so so yeah I mean like that’s that’s how we’ve decided we’re going to do the filtering or I mean like that’s I think maybe how makes most sense to do the filtering of products is literally just by filtering

(02:44) vendors so so vendors like on board into the protocol vendors on board into the marketplaces and they’re subject to the rules and Justice processes of both the protocol at a very high level which again I think maybe we would just say no kids no kidneys and then the marketplaces have their own sort of like maybe stricter interpretations of what sort of products a vendor can have and then they have a Justice process to boot a vendor in the case where they’re they’re hosting products and so so yeah

(03:19) I mean like sorry go ahead Excuse excuse me I’m sorry for interrupting but why is the buyer not an actor in this protocol the buyer is is so this is I would say and actually I think you’re you’re probably right and this is like something this is a thought process that I’ve gone through with vendors but I’ve yet to like fully comprehend buyers I think because to me buyers are are separated in two categories what we call like guest buyers and logged in buyers and so like a guest buyer should be able

(03:52) to come and initiate a transaction without having any sort of like social social profile right but if you want to have like if you want to leave a review if you want to log in you should have to create an nft and you’re absolutely right I think that that that probably does live at the protocol level so so you’re right I I think we just haven’t I haven’t made the change to reflect that yet but you you’re right buyers do exist at the protocol L I think unless in the moment that buyers log in

(04:23) through their wallet address I think they’re already logged in I mean they don’t have a store or anything but they they exist as actors and they have a reputation too I suppose you’re right but that reputation only exists as at the marketplace level so like a Marketplace will maintain a database if if they make a purchase then it’ll be using their their wallet but it won’t have the like they have to M an on an nft to have this like sort of social profile so like and that’s sort of what

(04:56) I mean is like you can log into a website and go through the authorization process using a wallet but then that’s like the authorization of the front end that’s stored in the front end’s database it’s not a record of like the buyer at the protocol level because in order to enable like those like sort of social tracking metrics they would have to like be part of a buyer registry that we’re indexing at the protocol level and in order to do that they would have to perform a separate onchain action and

(05:27) and and I think that like when we dive into to some of the tokenomics stuff we’ve been thinking of yeah I think that like a guest buyer someone who just buys with their cryptocurrency wallet is not someone who can receive protocol emissions or like e-commerce protocol or sorry social protocol emissions they probably can’t even receive although I doubt there will be any e-commerce protocol emissions but to create maybe they could because if I mean it’s not the same thing having a buyer that has like one or two

(06:00) transactions versus a buyer that has like thousands of transactions that that’s a power buyer and maybe they could have access to Greater discount levels they could be more trustworthy Etc and they could they could engage in practices that are better for the e-commerce system I think what Bose is saying is they have to opt in they could still be a power buyer but they wouldn’t opt into the ecosystem if they didn’t want to they would should and they probably would benefit from it but they don’t have to right Bo I mean yeah I

(06:32) think well I mean this is an interesting question because like in reality right like if they didn’t want to like log into the social aspects they didn’t want the to receive the benefits and they didn’t want the they could just use the base e-commerce protocol and then whoever’s selling on that but like yeah maybe if they want access to these more social aspects like we force a login of some kind well they also want the prote they might want the protection or the justice but not want the some are more

(07:02) Anonymous or private or it might be different reasons I don’t know or does just give up privacy is a good question too right I mean I I think this is an interesting question and it’s something that we need to put a little bit more thought into but like bu login versus like because it’s also making me think like okay well how does a guest do disputes right like because a guess even if you’re a guest buyer you should be able to be do a dispute and so like maybe the solution there is is as Jose is saying like we just have to

(07:38) force everyone to like sort of create this like social profile or it’s like we have to design it in a way such that like someone can raise a dispute even if they don’t have the social profile or like as part of the dispute process like you just have to create this profile like if you want to leave a review if you want to have a dispute you sort of have to have a social profile and so maybe it’s like we allow guest buyers and then we incentivize the creation of the profile but it’s not necessary

(08:09) unless you want to engage in any of the core actions that like of the ecosystem right like if so if you want to leave a review if you want to to raise a dispute then then you have to have a profile and and you have to create that through your through your wallet I think that makes sense so like you can you can do a buy And if every goes fine then sure but and also like vendors will and we’ll get to this a little bit further down I think there’s another there’s maybe a good time to like pivot to here into one of

(08:41) these other discussions I think this one here is about that’s the that’s your judgment your appeal cost function I I added some observations on the on the notes this is the appeal cost function this one is about the like random selection of Judges yeah and yeah and so this one is yeah well one there’s like Mike’s comment which did Shoppers get less than 100% refunded if they if they want to dispute and we recently had a conversation with Andrew Lee where he mentioned that buyers are like buyers expect aund like we’ll we’ll

(09:18) settle for nothing less basically than a 100% refund that’s sort of what they expect I mean Jose do you want to sh and then yeah my comment here I think the reputation should factor into the initial AC calcul so like that’s again something that we should haven’t really thought of but again that it implies that a buyer has a reputation which means they have a social profile so yeah but but that’s a way of like filtering out like sort of the refund abuse right if someone like because again we have to trust that the

(09:51) that the the system works most of the time or at least that it it is pretty consistently trustworthy and that like disputes even though there subjective will will resolve in the truth more often than not like it’s an assumption that we have to make but like it’s we’re just gonna have to make that assumption and if that’s true then a someone who’s who’s like spamming disputes should be ruled against at a pretty high rate and that would impact their their reputation and thus impact the cost of of making an

(10:24) initial dispute at all right if they have like a negative dispute and that that somehow is like a a constant modifier on the the cost of appeal which is one of the reasons you should have buyers in the protocol because that that reputation carries over into the marketplace and possibly other marketplaces like this guy he prone to make a refund abuse and so he has a higher appeal cost if that is factored into the F and and that’s what I’m saying I think I think maybe and and let me know if you disagree but I think

(10:58) maybe what I said a little a little bit earlier is maybe the best is the best solution I can come up with at least which is that like guests can buy guests just can’t take actions so like a guest buyer could buy something and then if and hopefully everything just goes according to plan and they don’t get any rewards and they don’t get any discounts and we’re not tracking anything like that but if they want to leave a review and if they want to raise a dispute all of a sudden now they have to to create a

(11:23) profile and I don’t think this like solves for like civil abuse so like if someone comes in makes a purchase raises a dispute and then makes a new profile makes a purchase raises a dispute like how do we distinguish how do we have like civil resistance to someone just spting up new new profiles every time we’ve had various I I I don’t know really what the answer is to that well in that case you’d be pitting a vendor with a quite a large and good reputation versus a buyer with no reputation so that kind of should

(12:06) indicate that you’re having that that you should consider the vendor more than the buyer it it makes me think yeah it makes yeah I mean I think that maybe it yeah we need to work a little bit more on this formula and figure out like what because because there’ll be a bunch of different factors that go into determining like initial appeal cost and and I think that that should be one one of them so as long as we’re talking about it so you added this like plus one here yeah I so and I don’t quite

(12:35) understand because I I that’s so that’s why I have this plus one in the initial formula right so like if we imagine that the in the first dispute there is an against ruling so f is zero and but it’s f plus one so that you end up with one over one and so now the cost of a dispute is increased to to to just whatever the dispute amount is right and we can but but that’s why added that one there right is so that you never have a a denominator of zero oh I see well then you forgot the parenthesis a math you’re right you’re

(13:11) right a mathematician yeah yeah you’re right whoops okay yeah yeah I also I see what you’re saying if I could just say about order of operations okay good David go ahead should we consider preventive suspension of accounts in case a vendor receiv receives more than one dispute in one week for example imagine they don’t have stock but they keep selling as they have right and they want just to gather some money and then close the account but not deliver so I think that’s in prevention yeah that yeah I think that that is

(13:50) solved by so so there’s two design patterns that that solve that one is the the staking of vendors so like we again we’ll jump into this like process a little bit here but like a vendor technically is registered outside of our e-commerce Proto protocol and each of these marketplaces theoretically will have an interface to be able to like if if someone wants to register as a vendor in one of these marketplaces what’ll happen is it’ll like they’ll be running their own like relay node they will

(14:21) register with the super protocol this vendor and then they will like immediately issue them the like social nft and so now they have like sort of these two profiles right but like they have it’s all been created within one Marketplace and so like their data technically exists like out here outside of the protocol but also then there’s like a a checking here where they exist in the vendor registry and the vendor registry here is going to require some state so like if you want to be upgraded to a vendor then you have to State some

(14:54) token and that token again we we don’t have like a per we don’t have a formula for it yet but like that should have some relationship with the amount of total escrow you can hold at any given time and so and so vendors like get emissions and as a result of like good behavior their their total escrow amount will increase over time if if they’re good actors but it’s like sort of a natural limit on how much escrow they can hold and then when they’re in escrow like and multiple disputes have been

(15:27) raised yeah I mean think that there should be some some like sanity check number of like if you’re being ruled if you have P disputes taken out against you and you’re ruled against in all cases like then you should be just like suspended as as a vendor at the protocol level but I think that that will come naturally sort of as a result of like the vendor reputation so so there’s like a natural limit on how much esro they can have based on the amount that they’ve staked those Stakes can also be

(15:57) slashed in in the result of like like we can also write conditions where like if you have like a a 70% J if you fall below a certain threshold of like disputes resolved against you we can slash their stick and and just like take the money take half of the money that they have staked in the vendor registry or in in their like vendor stake and and so like yeah there there’s a couple of like punishing mechanisms that we can Implement that have like real sort of monetary impact to vendors and those can be like exercised in pretty extreme

(16:34) cases I I would say like I forget who we were having this conversation with but someone saying that I think it was James who who is saying like obviously people respond better to positive incentives to negative than negative incentiv so it should be some like again we’re not quite sure what the parameter is yet but that’s the mechanism I think that would resolve that okay because at the end the same we we are willing to punish bad behavior we can recompensate we can it’s kind of a multiplier for good behavior

(17:05) right if you keep a good how to say a good point marker for a long time and you don’t have disputes and all your vendor all your customers are happy you keep a multiplier in governance while when you have a dispute you you go back to zero it’s kind of a video game right if you do things right you get the multiplier when you fail the multiplier goes away right so that incentives people to have good behavior yeah I mean and we can also use like because again so we’ll have like a formula that dictates amount total

(17:44) escrow possible right so like your your volume as a vendor is is dictated by some combination of your stake and your reputation and so like the reputation can be a constant or or exponential multiplier some some exponential multiplier of your allowed like like basically it can it can change the collateralization ratio of your total allowable escrow right so if you have $100 Stak and initially we say okay you have zero reputation so that means that you can have like $50 in total escrow right and so you make a couple of sales

(18:22) and five stars and now like okay you have a five star review weighted by this many number of sales now your $100 State means that you can have $500 worth of total e right in that case maybe you should consider a logarithmic function and not an exponential one why because for the first for the first few transactions you gain reputation quickly and and you gain access to bigger Stakes quickly but then after you have like thousands of transactions any additional positive transactions is not going to make a real difference so that’s

(18:58) logarithmic yeah okay yeah yeah no I I I agree and and hon and yeah any help in designing these multipliers and and in functions would be would be much appreciated and and yeah especially like catching catching order of operations airs when they occur my apologies for that so so I think that’s all the comments I I think I’ll dive in unless we have any more any more I just want to anything any other comments or like from from the Discord can you hear me or I’m not sure but in case something goes wrong

(19:30) you you tend to you use your insurance so to speak what do you mean so so being so being a buyer and logging in before every transaction is is I would consider that as a sort of an insurance policy for for using the open trustless well trustless quote quote trustless Marketplace MH where I mean Amazon Amazon and and in those cases using being able to use the dispute mechanism to get some money back I would consider that to be some sort of an insurance and it has a cost hence hence the fees yeah well I mean yeah I

(20:12) think that like yeah the fees the fees make a lot of sense for given that like both of these things are a service right yeah yeah dispute resolution is is an insurance policy and it’s it’s a service right right and the fees would be to incentivize the judges because the the the judg is doing Duty on this on a dispute that that’s that’s considered a service yeah yeah I think that that’s a that’s a job right so like so when I think about actors I think about them as like people with jobs right like these

(20:48) are all jobs within the ecosystem fire is maybe the only thing we could say is not a job but even they have have things like tasks to do that contribute to the overall health of the ecosystem and I would even say that that is like maybe like one of the like the things to to like that is different about web 3 is that like like for instance when buyers leave reviews that’s data that is valuable to Amazon and so so in a sense like even though they’re the ones who are like consuming the service like they also

(21:26) play a part and have a small job and job should be rewarded right and so and so that’s that’s like sort of how I think about all these actors all these actors have have jobs to do and and I guess here also like is probably devs but like devs is a little bit harder because they’re doing offchain stuff although I think that they should be paid out of the marketplace treasury but I think this encapsulates all the jobs but yeah this this one’s a little bit harder because it’s hard to like Define well you you put devs there

(22:03) I was also why not put on a protocol as well because we would want development on the if you mean Grant I mean I was thinking about grants for Developers for building tools in the protocol yeah I mean again it’s like so when when we’re talking about this e-commerce protocol right like all it’s doing is collecting some small fee in order to maintain like and then the protocol down will just pay debt right and and those those are like sort of social commitments right rather than onchain enforceable actions because like

(22:41) the maintenance of a front end and uptime and and everything like that the protocol I mean I guess there’s like sort of I think that gets a little bit too complex but like yeah so like the protocol Dow and this protocol Dow might create like work streams for development Bounties in a similar way that the marketplace Dow might create bounties for for its developers and give give some budget to to those work streams and everything like that but I just I’m I’m I’m like now I guess part of why I’m

(23:17) like hesitant to to include him is like these these actors are the ones that we can when we’re thinking about tokenomics we can really think about like incentives for whereas like Dev incentive is just to like continue the site functioning and and a lot of that is just like Web Two stuff protol is a little bit different the tokenomics thing hinges upon transactions I mean transactions in the marketplace being the the atomic element that drives everything so I don’t see how devs could could somehow earn incentives based on

(23:54) each transactions to me they should be that that should be outside of the scope of the of the token agreed I mean manage it through a foundation or some other mechanism I think I don’t know no I I agree and that’s sort of what I mean is like it’s yeah these are the actors who get token admissions within the protocol the devs have to be paid outside of like through the down through the individual Dow treasuries and the Dows will make money if there in if transactions are happening and they’ll make it not in protocol token

(24:31) right like they’ll make it in a percentage of the hard currencies that are being transacted with so yeah so I guess yeah let’s not let’s not think about them for now okay any any more thoughts or questions here why don’t you include the buyers in the marketplace actors both what’ you say why don’t you include the buyers there as actors in The Marketplace because to me it’s like sort of a question of it’s like a question of this is maybe maybe I’m confusing myself in in thinking about like where the the data

(25:12) exists versus where the emissions happen so maybe okay okay it’s not a big deal no never mind never mind never mind no no no no no no no I think this I think I think you’re right I think that this is a good question because because like when we’re talking about well I mean there’s like part of the reason I put those two like vendors and ah logged in buyers yeah vendors and I’m just going to call them buyers for now but vendors and buyers in the protocol is because both of these are portable right

(25:49) like that’s sort of our whole our whole thing is like both of these exist and and the vendor can can go to vendor and buyers can go to this Market Marketplace and then they can leave and go to this marketplace right and go they leave and go to this Marketplace but one of the things that we’ve been thinking about is how to how to just determine where emissions come from so we know that like the protocol Dow is the one that’s going to be ultimately controlling like the emissions of the token and then what we

(26:18) were thinking and and this is where I would like some some feedback and thought is that the protocol Dow has a couple of different kinds of emissions right the first is directly to its sort of supreme court so where did where did my little tokens go okay so Bo to use the analogy if if the protocol Dow is sort of like the Federal Reserve right yeah and marketplaces are commercial Banks then I think I think that that the protocol emissions to the buyers and vendors should occur at the marketplace level and they should be somehow

(26:54) trickled down from the protocol Dow right this this is exactly what I’m getting at right is that there is you’re you’re exactly on the money right this is how we’re thinking about it is that there is a percentage of of tokens in in the sort of like base form right that flow straight to the Supreme Court right to this this protocol level judge registry and and hopefully but again like just deciding the the different like emissions rates and and how much and and everything like that hopefully this judge pool is not being used that

(27:27) much right this judge pool is sort of there to determine and we need to like think and write out like what is the jurisdiction of this judge pool what does it mean for a dispute to be escalated from the marketplace level to the protocol level because because like clearly like they can settle disputes of like the protocol Dow thinks that this Marketplace is engaged in fraudulent activity generally fraudulent activity and so they raise they they initiate a Justice process which is then decided by this the the people in this judge

(28:04) registry right but like if there’s an internal Marketplace dispute if like one buyer is like has a dispute with a vendor does that ever act exit the marketplace judge pool unless like I mean I can imagine a condition where someone’s like hey I think that the the marketplace is [ __ ] around and protocol protocol judges you need to take a look at this and then it instigate sort of a like wide but but that gets really really complicated and I don’t I haven’t fully wrapped my head around how that worked but but okay so

(28:36) let’s let’s just get back to this idea tokens in their base form emitted to the judge registry then we also have tokens and we think that they should be emitted to the marketplaces in their Stak form and by that I mean like when a Marketplace is formed the initial governors of the market place we’ll have like to we’ll have to stake into like a a Marketplace Dow contract which has been determined by by the larger Dow oh my God yeah and then why can’t I move it all right oh oh there we go all

(29:20) right so and that will create like for instance let’s say let’s call the the protocol token load called The Marketplace Hamza that would create this token which is a wrapped version of the the initial token which is like Hamza load and we think that that’s how the protocol should emit generally right is it emits based on certain criteria um which this criteria are things that the protocol can set as parameters to weight in its determination of percentage allocation of tokens so if it’s allocating 20% to the judge pool and 80%

(30:05) to the market places then like vendors get rewarded in tokens through the marketplaces where they’re making sales and and so like then you have the marketplace Dow which is just receiving these token emissions and it has a governance process to to determine the percentages that it allocates to buyers to its judges and to its vendors and then to its Governors right and then those are sort of the parameters that the that the marketplace Governors can set to either incentivize vendors to on board in their Marketplace they

(30:39) incentivize more judges but they can and so these are the sort of like rough metrics that we decided or or at least initially outlined would be good markers of and and these aren’t perfect but like these are some some good initial thoughts of like what are the are the things that would would wait at different levels to determine what percentage are flowing to which marketpl like aesco time it again not perfect we talked to Mike a little bit about this and he raised this idea of like some marketplaces will be shipping from China

(31:13) to South America and that’s like that requires make container require container tips right and so like how how can you how can this be a fair metric and I think that maybe I don’t really know how to determine like what is a fair metric for that I think what we said was well you could you could consider a a class of of similar marketplaces and the standing or ranking of that Marketplace in that class do I do do I make myself clear on that yeah I mean it’s hard to so so the the the one thing to remember is that

(31:57) like what what the protocol knows is it knows average escro time right it doesn’t know what the expected escro time is unless we write that on chain somehow and so this was this was the the idea Mike had was like maybe it’s the differential between expected and actual delivery so like expected escro time versus actual escro time another way to say do it is like the protocol Dow might be able to like set as a parameter what a standard right so like we know that one day delivery is possible Right Amazon does it maybe it’s a little bit

(32:35) optimistic given the the decentralized nature of our protocol but like the protocol could set like a a a number that it expect that is like some good average for for all of this and then in aggregate like whether or not Market places are falling two and away from that is is sort of a different a different issue so so I don’t know I’m not quite sure yeah I think a average escro time versus expected escro time that I think that would be a good index yeah it it would be fair it would be something to to make comparisons across

(33:08) all marketplaces Fair yeah because then yeah I mean I guess like marketplaces can can compete with one another based on their average expected time and and that’s like something that they can display to users right and I mean I I I think that that’s maybe the fairest way to look at it but again we got to remember what what is onchain information what is what is what is information that the smart contract can’t know so so yeah that’s sort of what we have in terms of like General flow right now I wonder if there’s any

(33:44) any sort of General comments thoughts questions can you hear me now yeah yeah okay great that works yeah I was seeing a couple things the call but about the the escro time I think we’re maybe chat with James it’s the what’s the what’s the declared time and then if it’s a diff if it’s longer than expected by the agreement that would be a negative I don’t know if you cover yeah I mean you must yeah you must have missed that but I said that your your suggestion was expected versus actual okay and then way back I tried to

(34:25) say something where about the bio reputation I it makes me think of eBay more than Amazon but eBay days even buyers wanted to get their feedback to be able some sellers wouldn’t wouldn’t transact with low feedback buyers buyers used to have reputation on eBay so we could have it where the seller just doesn’t want to interact with low quality or new buyers I think that was a setting eBay has or had if I recall well and I also think that that’s that’s the transaction P pattern dictated by the e-commerce protocol is

(34:57) that the vendor has to accept a an order and so in that in that process they would see what the what the buyer’s reputation is and so I I I I think that would I think that that would actually just be forced upon us oh really we couldn’t set couldn’t let the seller set a requirement if they wanted like if they have a high value item or or something no no that no I’m saying like it would I’m I’m saying we can’t go the other way where where a buyer initiates a transaction and the seller is forced

(35:31) into it I think the pattern is that the seller has to because the seller has to sign in order to produce the the agreed upon address where the counterfactual smart contract will be deployed and so like the the the vendor has to has to agree to a sale before before before an order is initiated in real time right based under settings so it could be a smart contract is what you’re saying or in like the next day or 12 hours later did it accept it or yeah I mean like there’s I I guess I I I don’t know exactly how I haven’t

(36:09) really given any thought to like how we would make it how we would enforce that like a vendor has to respond during a certain amount of time it’s something something certainly to think about that might not be nice for the buyer because the buyer I think especially with Amazon and others are used to just buying and basically there’s no way to not do it yeah but but that’s what I’m saying is like I don’t think we can actually with the way that the counterfactual smart contract deployment works I don’t

(36:38) think we can initiate an order without I mean like we could on our like layer and then we could like impact vendor reputation if they refuse to buy but like the way that like the transaction works at the e-commerce protocol level like the because like the the vendor has to sign a message which produces the address that the buyer ultimately sends the money to right so like they have to produce a signature that attests that’s when when when on our call yesterday Martin was talking about attestation so they have

(37:22) to like attest to the fact that they will process that order and so like the the payment doesn’t happen like immediately like because again we’re working with like it’s like when you use like hdle hoddle and you do like peer-to-peer Bitcoin multisig transactions like the buyer has to accept the contract and then you can deposit into the contract but with counterfactual like and and so like the contract gets deployed even if the buyer doesn’t doesn’t accept but with a counterfactual smart contract deployment

(37:51) we wouldn’t know the address of the the eventual escro contract until the Buy accepts or sorry until the vendor accepts the order I don’t think that’s right anyone can calculate that address and as long as there’s like a standard way to calculate it the buyer should be able to send the money to the address before the the contract is actually created I mean I’ll I will check that out but that’s got to be the way that works we can’t have like someone buy something and then not be able to pay

(38:25) for it until later that will just lose sales I’m sure that’s not the way it’s supposed to work okay hopefully I’m wrong about it then but in that case then we go back to this problem of like vendors can’t refuse a sale and and I and I guess that’s fine but yeah then then vendors just have to do sales whenever they they get one I was under the we should definitely come back to that and confirm that because that’s pretty big point but yeah I don’t yeah like I said I don’t think that’s the way

(38:55) that it’s G to work that it’s meant to work rather let’s make a note to come back to it and I’m making a note now I mean another way another way the seller could discourage a new buyer is have a higher price I don’t know if you think that’s possible but they could give or give a discount maybe it’s not a higher price but they give a discount to a established buyer either or or Rewards or incentives I mean I feel like there’s got to be various different ways to incentivize good buyers and

(39:27) disincentivize newer bad buyers or or is that you don’t think there’s some logic we could put in there to do that no can can you make a note about that about that that comment I’m trying to okay write down this note transaction flow work C because John if if it does like so if it doesn’t work like that then a vendor has to accept an order if it does work in the way that I that I think it does which I could be I I I’m I’m very open to being wrong about this but if it works in that way where a vendor has to

(40:02) make an attestation and make a signature before they produce an address like then maybe we have to design our own sort of like intermediary escrow where that is just like as soon as that like as soon as the buyer or the vendor produces their signature and contract it automatically just sends to them I know that adds like sort of a layer of complexity to it but but to avoid that problem of like losing sales because the the the transaction doesn’t happen immediately like that I think that would maybe be the workaround but again I

(40:36) don’t I I’m I’m you may be correct and it may not work that way and it might just be that like as soon as a transaction is initiated it’s sent straight to the generated address and no signature is required from the vendor in order to generate it so what if what if they do it in in E ether and then ether drops 30% % in 12 hours or or 10% or 20% do you mean like oh in our in like intermediary escro solution and then the buyer would just be like no I won’t accept this or sorry the vendor would

(41:13) just be like no I won’t accept this yeah yeah yeah I mean that is a problem in that case Pur would have a buffer of certain percentage of of over the funded transaction Val value to account for cryptocurrency volatility I think theirs was 8% so if you if you have if you’re transacting in cryptocurrency and the and the crypto and and the currency fluctuates too much in value you use the buffer and if the buffer is not enough then the transaction goes back into requiring funds State yeah I mean it does it does beg

(42:00) this like sort of larger question about our denominator currency and whether or not USD is like always our denominator maybe I mean certainly that’s a discussion for another time and something we need to maybe give a little bit more thought to but because like volatility is a relationship right like volatility is something that is expressed in a relationship to a currency denominator rather than something like like if if someone just wants ether and they’re like I want this much ether for this thing then the volatility relative to

(42:42) the dollar doesn’t matter but it’s it’s it’s similar in like nft sales right where an nft collection will set a price and that price is denominated in ether and they don’t care about the volatility USD they just want whatever it is ether and so I don’t know that’s something sorry go ahead could you somehow make that into into like a vendor option like the vendor could set his own parameters like say I want this if if it’s a cryptocurrency we’re using the price items in I want I I expect to be paid in

(43:16) that amount regardless of volatility something like that I mean you could you could make it into like part of the the vendor configuration thing does that make sense yeah that’s that that would be like this little structure I’m creating here currency denominator and I guess that would depend on the on particular items yeah yeah because I mean like it would also change based on yeah just so yeah one of the other things we were talking about is like swaps at the point of sale in in the like sort of protocol level

(43:54) transaction logic oh man I feel like we guys this is a this is a complex project yeah yeah I mean we could just stick to stable coin I Still Believe We Still Believe most will want stable you’re talking about like Dynamic pricing where the price of the item fluctuates with the cryptocurrency’s relationship to the dollar versus like a static amount I think it I think if people care about the relationship to the to the dollar they will just ask for the price in stable coin I think that’s the that’s

(44:32) the actual solution to that yeah I mean well but like what if they set a price for an item in like should it be possible for them to set a price for an item in dollars and then like I mean it should be possible for them to set a price for an item in dollars and then also accept e and then layer yeah I think that’s a layer on top though like they could Implement that themselves in which like they’re periodically changing their products price in the directory uh but whether they Implement that themselves or someone else

(45:05) implements that as like a layer on top or we provide that as a service to them it’s still like regardless like an outer layer because it’s not I mean the real like convenient solution to that would be just price your item in usdt or usdc or some other St it’s possible to do yeah for to themselves just do it manually and then the next level would be for them to automate that and then another level would be for us or someone else to be like hey we have provided the service that will do that for you it’s something to think I I I will

(45:47) say I think we’re we’re getting a little bit too much into the Weeds on on these like on these like hyper like hyp specific technical issues yes Ian right right yeah so if if if you don’t mind if we could just like take a little bit of a step back and talk about this this General sort of mechanism here this idea that the protocol Dow emits natural tokens and then also emits like what is functionally the governance token for marketplaces to marketplaces who then are able to distribute it can we can we

(46:22) just like can I start a little bit of a discussion of like so what do people think of this does this make sense what are what are the holes in in this idea if if you can identify any of them and I’m going to I’m going to go silent just for a second because I also need to go bathroom but yeah if you if you all wouldn’t mind discussing that oh I have a really dumb question but what what is the difference between a a token a pure token like the one above in in the from the protocol down to the judge registry an estate

(46:53) token so when uh so this state token is like the governance token in the marketplace de so so when you think about it it’s like there let’s say at the protocol level there there are like three genres of token right there is let’s let’s call it load token which is just the base the base erc20 token doesn’t have a lot of functionality but can be given functionality by being St in into a contract so for instance you can take this token and you can stake it in the protocol Dow smart contract which

(47:33) produced this produces the wrapped like protocol governance token so that’s the token that would have rights to vote on protocol parameters emission schedules weights to different metrics changes in metrics changes to acceptance of judges in the registry there’s a whole there’s a bunch of different like decisions that the protocol Dow should be able to make and that’s also another discussion that we need to like we need to think about and Define what are those actions of the protocol Dow that can be voted on with

(48:03) this token so the other action that you can take with the base token is you can stake them in the marketplace contract which creates a a new Marketplace D and creates and and through that staking process it creates like the stake governance token for that Marketplace D which again gives you the rights to vote on the parameters that exist at the marketplace Dow level so so again like there’s this base token base token can be staked into the protocol Dow to to vote on protocol Dow issues the base token can be staked into the marketplace

(48:39) contract to create a Marketplace Dow which is then governed by the state tokens in that Marketplace Dow contract and then when the protocol emits it emits basically it emits like the base token to the mark Marketplace Dow contract and deposits them in some sort of like Dow smart contract controller which the Dow sets the parameters of to distribute to its various like participants Market participants right so this protocol Dow token can be then sent to the judge pool can be sent X Y and Z this is another thing that we were

(49:19) I’m not quite sure on but that could exist and and and again maybe this is getting a little bit like it there there’s a lot of background information here it will maybe make sense to John and Mike I don’t know if it’ll make a ton of sense to everyone else but like that probably exists as a mool lockal with a treasury that treasury is collecting Pro Marketplace fees and then if you wanted to exit the marketplace you would functionally burn this token receive some of the base token and your share of the underlying treasury so yeah

(49:54) I mean like I I I don’t know if that it answers your question and I get that that that that’s like a pretty complex answer but but that’s the answer yes it it I mean it is pretty complex but then in that case what why would the judge registry receive pure token pure tokens pure load tokens and not State uh because theoretically the like the load the pure load tokens have like a market value and so like so it’s a way of just like sort of paying them but also they don’t exist in a Marketplace so it doesn’t

(50:33) make sense to give them like these governance tokens maybe it makes sense to give them the protocol down governance tokens but but I think it’s like it should be they should be given the choice of like because like in this construction the base token has a value and then all the stake tokens should have a value that is higher than the base token value maybe not by a lot but sort of logically because they’re tied to a treasury and maybe I mean honestly maybe this base token this is also a mck dow and this is just a treasury share so

(51:11) a similar relationship can exist where you just emit this base token and you can if you really just want to exit the whole system you just burn it and take your your percentage of the underlying protocol Treasury and maybe that’s a better way because then it’s not like we’re not letting market dynamics dictate the the the payment that we’re giving the judge registry instead we’re like allowing the the treasury to sort of Fleet free float the value so it can like dilute the value of an underlying

(51:39) treasury which is denominated in the number of different currencies but like someone can always just like take a payment and then burn it and take like whatever the underlying currency is and that’s what their payment would be for engaging in in this like sort of Supreme Court Justice system Jose your question is why does the judge registry not get a stake token reward why do they get a just a straight unstake token reward whereas the marketplace gets a stake token reward is that right yeah sort of I’m I’m just trying

(52:14) to wrap my head around the staking versus pure token thing did you get your head around it like somewhat but but let me ask another question to see if I’m understanding the correctly suppose somebody buys load token on on a Marketplace on a market on a on a cryptocurrency exchange where I mean what prevents that person from engaging in in in judging and and being part of the judge registry and taking decisions on the protocol now the does that does that question make any sense at all yeah it does so so there’s I think

(52:57) that there’s two answers here one is and and again not all of this is fully formed I sort of have an answer to your question but I am not 100% certain that this should be the way it works so again we had had a conversation with Martin he was talking about like the process by which someone signs up to become a judge and so I wrote a couple of thoughts about that over here somewhere yeah so like the governors of the Dow should set a judge Target and then they set a minimum like sort of state that a judge has to put up of the base token in order

(53:37) to be to enter the judge q and then pental judges app apply to the judge Q based on where their position is relative to the Target so like if we set a target of 10 and they’re the first person to apply it would cost much less than if we set a target for 10 and they were the H hundredth person in line that that should cost more to prevent like a spamming of of the queue and then the governor this is a decision that I think the governor should should be able to make at both levels is they sort of review and approve judges to be

(54:12) added to the queue and and then they start like being assigned cases and render judgments and they receive rewards Bas based on that so what prevents someone from buying the tokens on a an exchange and and then joining the judge Q nothing right like other than Supply Dynamics so like how how much of the supply is really actually hitting the open market some of that will determine whether or not they can judge the Jo join the judge registry also what is the target for the number of Judges how many judges are already in

(54:42) the queue so on and so forth so that that’s what prevents that what prevents someone staking in governance also nothing right so like some of this is like we’re going have to to game out the supply Dynamics and how much we anticipate or expect there to hit the Open Market at any given time and again if we if we tie the value a little bit to the to the underlying treasury if if if for instance it’s a so so I guess let me explain a little bit of like the way a molok dow Works a molock dow has two tokens it has a governance token which

(55:17) is sort of what I’m talking about in like you you can state or like I guess the base token would be the treasury token and the treasury token is related to an underlying treasury in a proportional relationship so if there’s like $100 in an underlying Treasury and you have one of a hundred tokens you can burn you can go to the contract and burn that token and take $1 out because you own you you are the Redemption rate is proportional to the underlying Treasury and then as the treasury grows your proportion stays the same but the number

(55:49) value of that token also it is correlated to or is proportional to the under Ling treasury value now you can stake that token and create the the governance version of the token as well or we can issue that separately right the again that that’s something that we we don’t quite know how that works but like let’s let’s just imagine that it’s like stake and then that gives you some sort of governance right the staking process requires investing for a period but it also entitles you to some emissions of the base token as a result

(56:22) of your like governance responsibility and and then again we can we can we can tie things like number of votes cast versus number of total votes as a metric for how much of those emissions you receive as a reward for for good governance or for engagement in in in governance we can also look at metrics like number of votes on that you’re on the right side of anyway it’s neither here nor there the the point I’m making is that if we we tie it to this like sort of underlying treas value then the market dynamics should push it into like

(56:55) that the the open market value should be the value of sort of like the underlying treasury instrument or the proportional value of the underlying treasury instrument and as the the the the market value of it changes people who hold it could be incentivized to either buy or sell if it goes below sort of what the Redemption rate is then theoretically people would buy to then redeem it and and and so you have this like sort of natural Arbitrage that starts taking place to to balance the the market price versus the Redemption price so so yeah I

(57:31) mean it gets into a pretty complex I think economic model and that’s part of like I think why we’re engaged in this process at all is to like start understanding what all these how all these Dynamics impact the price of the underlying token and and how it maintains any level of stability and what like an emission schedule can even look like if if we construct this way Jose is it helpful to think of the rewarding of just plain token as kind of like a payment like someone getting paid a paycheck or some monetary reward whereas

(58:10) issuing the stake token is kind of like it implies more of a commitment like a responsibility or sort of like an ongoing relationship kind of more like a some sort of privileged stock that comes with voting rights or dividends or something like that is it helpful to think of it that way does that kind of clarify it it is yes it is so so that that’s that’s why Bo was saying that the state token has a higher Val has a higher underlying value than the pure token right depending on what you want yes like if you want if you’re okay with the

(58:46) state with the token being locked in stake and you like the the rewards that it comes with like the extra rewards then yes that is more valuable to to you like by by Ling it you’re taking value away from it so then you need to add something to it to make it to make it worthwhile to people but yeah it comes with if you wanted like to bind that relationship between the judges and the protocol then that could be a stake token it depends on what we want to like what relationships we want to maintain and be fine

(59:23) there yeah because like again we’re we’re sort of defining admission schedules as John said yeah we could we could admit to judges some amount of or we could allow them to choose right like do you want the governance token which is non-transferable and you can’t sell or do you I mean like or do you want the base token because you need a salary also that the government’s token doesn’t have to be non-transferable we again all all these things are sort of up in the air right now we’re we’re sort

(59:54) of arriving on a definition or a mechanism well in any case I think that that uh judges sitting on the protocol Dow level and not not being involved with marketplaces perhaps their Vote or their token values would be less than those sitting in the marketplaces and and transacting and everything I mean I understand that the whole point of tokens is that they’re fungible but votes and token values would seem to depend on on your contribution to the marketplaces right I didn’t quite follow that Jose you ask let let me see how I word

(1:00:38) this this better it would seem I mean I asked about a an ex individual buying token on the open market through an exchange and then do acquiring voting rights on the protocol it I mean it would seem to me that his voting rights is not as as as valuable as someone being involved in the marketplace and like for example saying vender yeah are you saying when you say valuable I think what you mean is like valuable to us like we would prefer that people who have voting rights are also involved in this in the they have like a social stake in the in

(1:01:18) the network not just like a rando dude off the street that’s more valuable because right because then you would then you would open up the the the Dow to speculation and that’s like bumping dumb schemes and all that stuff and and I don’t think we want that well then yeah then we have to be be like mindful of how available we make voting tokens like would they be available to buy on on I mean we can design that we can make it so that there’s only certain ways you can get voting tokens and only

(1:01:54) certain parties have rights to them and stuff like that so I I think we should keep in mind that this is supposed to be sort of a guild of of vendors of sellers so exactly it is the sellers the the ones that sort of vote in the community if we start giving votes to judges and all kinds of people that perform not the core activity which is basically to list products and sell them but the sort of of adj adjacent I think they’re called No adjacent activities I I think we’re over complicating the whole matter and we should try to

(1:02:34) simplify as much as possible because we also have to think how we’re going to sell this idea how we going to track sellers to actually come if it’s overly complicated then it’s just not going to be attractive enough in my opinion yeah that’s true I think I agree with you I think that like once we get the basic ideas like the basic basic roles and the basic who does what in the system and we will tweak things like that like we’ll find through just through analysis simulation or gaming whatever we decide

(1:03:07) to do that it’s not advantageous to make certain types of Rights available to this party or that party or something like that it’ll be kind of like part of the tweaking I used to say that on too but but actually we’re trying to make the Amazon process transparent and that does mean those people that are behind the scenes inside Amazon would be compensated through this token and incentivized with this token and the sellers are financing it and owning it but they they kind of need to support that kind of ecosystem of the

(1:03:39) arbitration yeah no no I I I can see the value of that I just just trying to bring to your attention to everybody’s attention that we should try to simplify it as much as possible meaning if he can be on the same token perhaps it’s easier here but if the solution is like a dual token then okay yeah it was just a comment no that makes sense but I think the idea is the sellers buy into this because it’s trust or it’s a trust token we I think the reason people want to transact on this versus just directly

(1:04:13) buying from others on a Marketplace is the transparency and the trust that it carries it’s like so the sellers buy into this for the purpose that the the customers trust this resolution process and dispute resolution process again I think like when when we’re talking about when we’re thinking about the construction of this it yeah it certainly seems complex but like from a vendor perspective and like they’ll be being rewarded in like like I would also say I don’t know that this is a dual token model right like it’s it’s a this

(1:04:50) is sort of what I’m what I’m saying is like it’s it’s one token right that token takes on different power as it is applied into different roles so like so so it’s like there’s one sort of Base currency that’s being emitted and that base currency has a Redemption rate and like at any point like so like if it’s wrapped here like if if the the marketplace is emitting to to vendors then then the vendor should have the choice of like okay do you wanna like do you want to take this token and do you

(1:05:26) want to like apply it and and and lock it into like the governance process do you want power in making more decisions or do you just want to burn it and take money right whatever currencies are are like held in in the various Treasures like when it’s admitted to them they should be given that choice and and so like yeah like they if they continue to like lock it into the system then they’ll get more power to make decisions over time but if all they care about is like making money in the short term then

(1:05:57) they won’t generate any sort of like protocol yield or power over time but they will just be able to like make money and get some form of like hard currency emissions a as they continue to engage the protocol in in in in a good way and yeah I mean I think it’s a it’s a it’s a very complex Balancing Act of like making sure that we don’t nuke the value of the token and making sure that all these incentives are aligned and that we’re emitting at the correct rates and and that that these things logically

(1:06:29) make sense and fit into each other but yeah I think that’s the that’s the difficulty of this like protocol of this toonomic design and and to that point I think that we could yeah also be emitting at the protocol level to vendors like they could get marketplaces could choose to incentivize vendors by emitting their own governance token to them but we could also admit that that idea of like well vendors exist at this protocol level and we want to incentivize them to join in general okay well we could do that through some

(1:07:03) parameter set by the Dow to choose to to again either give governance token or or base currency to to the vendors directly and when when can we we’re going to have to make some of the decisions relatively soon I believe yeah so what how how long do we have before we have to sort of boil this to actual decisions well I mean I think that how long do we have I would say we have I mean we we’ve come a long way and we understand how the mechanism roughly functions and so now it’s a question of like getting in and

(1:07:57) designing like some tests for economic models to to test out so so like we have to do some work of like defining all the decisions that the protocol Dow should make we have to make do some work about defining all the decisions that Marketplace Dows can make we need to figure out what parameters they can set and then we can start like building a model of what this like token flow looks like and start sort of thinking about initial parameters which tokens we want to emit where in terms of timeline it’s tough because I feel like like we have

(1:08:34) this we have this soft deadline of Mark for getting our initial react site up we have another sort of hard deadline of May for having it functioning together and then I imagine that’s when we start really deploying Dow contracts so I would say by by I mean probably earlier but like by mid to early April we should have this really well defined to to the point that we could actually build a model of it and yeah I I I think that’s a timeline that makes sense I think we’ll have to talk about thetimeline we

(1:09:11) have to coordinate a couple different things like we have to coordinate the protocol which still has a lot of questions with the token so timeline yeah it’s like what what you said is good as just a kind of rough guideline for now but I think we need to talk about it more to get into the details and we’ll come with a come up with like a better a more detailed picture as time goes on I think that the process for Designing the token is like this number one what we’re doing right now is just like very broad Strokes general idea of

(1:09:42) kind of what the the protocol what what the tokenomics of the protocol would sort of look like we can do that just by discussion as we’re doing Second Step would be to find some way to simulate it and game it out like to see how this actually works how how all the pieces interact and what needs to be tweaked in settings stuff like that and that’ll may require more discussion and like another iterative cycle of discussion going back to tweak and gaming and Etc until we get very close to what we think is

(1:10:19) releasable and something to consider regarding the the governance token that can be burned to to get cash that that that needs to be limited because in if for some reason a massive event of people wanting to burn their governance tokens happen at the same time we might not be able to pay them no that that would that would never be true because again the token is proportional to an underlying treasury so so if 70% of people wanted to burn their token all at the same time they would take 70% of an underlying treasury

(1:11:00) even if that treasury was $1 right they would dist it would distribute 70 cents to to all the people who burn their tokens so so the the the underlying treasury is never under collateralized all right all right got you John How would how would a simulation occur in this in this process would it be like setting up a a a test the marketplace as as we have done or or is it some kind of mathematical simulation or what I think there’s different ways to do it and we’ve talked about some of these ways so there’s

(1:11:35) software where we can kind of Define rules without actually like designing the Act without using necessarily the actual contracts of the tokens and stuff like that we can design like Define rules and then just run the simulation to see how everything interacts another way I’ve thought of I haven’t suggested it because I haven’t really thought it through is kind of making a game like an interactive game where human parties can act as the simulation agents where we can actually just make it a game and and try to gain

(1:12:10) some Advantage from it but again I might need to think that through a little bit I’m not sure if anyone has I love that idea I kind of like the idea yeah we have to we have I’m glad you like it we have to think about it though to see if it actually would be useful and worth the trouble that’s that’s idea there’s also sorry no I was gonna say because my initial idea was yeah to to build out like different representations of the like the smart contracts and the actors in Python and then and then yeah it’s

(1:12:41) just like a question of tweaking sort of like the system parameters and saying like well what what is our initial token distribution how many actors does that go to and like allow them a certain number of like random actions or even like determined actions or I mean we could even I don’t know I like building building out a a a like an AI agent simulation might be prohibitively expensive and prohibitively time consuming but yeah and then like if we build out a representation in Python of just these different objects like I I

(1:13:11) wonder how hard it would be P to Port over to like some web based game because that could be a cool way to like not only test it out but also like engage a community and and and maybe it’s like monetizable in and of itself right yeah it would be awesome we should we should also not discount like the amount of effort and time it would take to even just build that though absolutely so yeah I think that could be maybe like the game like the human powered game could be precursor to a simulation and the simulation doesn’t necessarily need

(1:13:41) to be driven by AI to software and also we felt thirdly we’ve talked to that group Senate who we can pay them to we can pay them for their software B basically their their simulation software which is specifically built to simulate to economics finally we can actually pay s it to I believe just do it for us like be consultants and help us run the software so there’s like four different levels possible different levels and I guess any others are open suggestion yeah because I I do think I think it will

(1:14:17) probably be necessary for us to hire two sets of Consultants one will be well three sets of Consultants really one is like sort of a toonomic consultant at some point like a like a actual like actual toonomic consultant and second is a governance consultant so like Dow house or Raid Guild would be examples of people who would help us and and like Martin I think can help us a little bit there as well but like in in doing some of these like actual implementations of these Dow mechanisms and the parameterizing voting and and

(1:14:50) building out some of those smart contracts people with like some some experience building some some more complex systems like this and then third is like all of this is going to have to be wrapped with a smart contract code on it just just for like santing purposes and so like th I anticipate all three of those sets of Consultants being fairely necessary at some point like I think we’re a threers Dev team right now and I think we can do a lot but like I do think that we’ll need some help and maybe it’s not like so far as like

(1:15:22) paying consulting firms and and maybe it looks a lot more like having engaging a community of people who represent those different constituencies and having them contribute and doing maybe some more coordinate sort of stuff to determine initial team distributions and getting Buy in from like industry participants that help us along this path but but yeah I think those those those are three areas that I I think we will we will really need to reach out for help for well regarding the simulation you could have like different classes of

(1:15:56) individuals or actors and then you would create the actors randomly like say you have a 20% of the users who are prone to make disputes and refunds for example and the vendors they you have 10% who are always making late transactions and all that stuff and then you could just create a bunch of mathematical entities representing those users and running that as a simulation but it’s it would be a random agent based simulation there’s there’s a NE package in Python it’s called simpai for handling asynchronous

(1:16:32) simulations like that I think you should gu you guys should check it out yeah that’s right that’s true and then just after you run a simulation you you you you get you get your data and then you analyze see what happens in this scenario basically yes yeah and even the process of analysis is pretty complicated so none of these things are simple no yeah yeah but this this is I mean if we if we skip those steps then we’ll be kind of gambling not simple but definitely doable now I do think that there is like

(1:17:15) I think that we can get to a place in the near term like some somewhere around March where we have our understanding of tokenomics our our tokenomics is sufficient enough that we can start presenting to like to investors because I think that that is like understanding like the exact parameters that we need to be tuning and building out the simulation and everything like that like I I I don’t know that we need to do all of that in order to be able to present to like an investor like a broad Strokes vision of

(1:17:49) how this this ought to work and so yeah I mean I don’t know that that’s a discussion that we maybe need to take up another time is like what when do we begin that process what is our strategy there I think a little bit of be informed by the work that I do in London and maybe some connections that I can make there as well as like I know everybody else is like traveling to other conferences places and I don’t know if we’ve really started coordinating like a investor relations team with an idea of like approaching a

(1:18:17) raise but but that is something that that that I think maybe we should start thinking about for sure well I think there’s also we’re we’re we have this news with the other protocol as you mentioned I guess I don’t know how much to reveal on the session but seems like it’s we’re getting closer to I mean I think that’s involved in this setting right like how we integrate with them as well and what their plan is that’s kind of at least been an excuse I’ll say for myself to delay the the deeper thinking but but

(1:18:46) this session has been very helpful as well yeah I think yeah at some point when things come together like more clearly we’re going to have to consider how our tokenomics interacts with their tokenomics Y and that will just become part of the overall simulation yeah especially given that like our Dow might control yeah the voting token of the the protocol Dow like or the the e-commerce protocol Dow so yeah because like then when we think about like Burn Right which Treasury is holding those tokens and is like is it like that that’s an

(1:19:29) interesting question of like if someone is able to burn an underlying treasury does that underlying treasury can like have a percentage of the super protocol tokens or is that like separate because that that also could be income right and so is that also counted when we’re thinking about the the underlying pry value okay I I feel like hour and half’s enough we don’t have to always fill two hours some this has been great thanks Bo really appreciate this it’s very helpful yeah it’s pretty Danse both

(1:20:05) thank you Hots off man because it’s a tough job for sure to figure out all these things appreciate the effort for sure look man this is I I will say this is my path like I I really dig this and this is like the the thing I enjoy thinking about the most like yeah there’s like a lot of other things that that that I have to to work on and do and but but this is like I I I think that this this is like the the the role I have Mo been most excited to fulfill and so so like look no know thank you for giving me the

(1:20:46) opportunity yeah this is good because it’s also a learning experience there’s so much to learn in this subject that indeed yes it’s such a complex like group of of skills and and knowledge that we’re all learning from it and that’s cool great okay yeah so next week we have a another town hall we’ll put in it’ll be actually a little bit different style I guess it’ll be more some updates about the team and and what’s happening but when should we do the next one of these and probably I don’t know I think we should

(1:21:22) have James here live when these happen if we can but I guess we can keep people updated about the next one for this B have yeah I mean I’m well and again it’s just like it it does it takes a lot of time and effort to to move forward and there’s yeah like a lot of thinking that has to go in again I would implore anyone who wants to to to jump in and give their like notes and suggestions appreciate Jose the the contributions you’ve made to the board but like notes and suggestions specifically around again parameters

(1:22:00) decisions that the Dow should be able to make clarifying questions around what these mechanisms look like and then all the way down unto like what what are the individual actions that we are incentivizing and disincentivizing for for particular actors within the ecosystem I think we finally settled on mostly with with with this like question of buyer being the last like sort of lagging issue of like where does this exist as an actor in the ecosystem I think we’ve finally sort of gotten an idea of where all these actors exist and

(1:22:30) what level they they exist at and where EVS can take place and so so yeah really really diving into like what what what formulas can we we start to build out as to how to determine percentages of payouts to individual actors within each of these different levels of the ecosystem any any sort of notes comments help would be much appreciated but in terms of time next Thursday would be fine Friday is when I leave for Bangkok so so this time next Thursday would oh no no no no because we’re doing our wednes town hall next Thursday next

(1:23:07) Wednesday night 800 PM Wednesday 8m Thailand oh okay so we could do Thursday okay so then yeah yeah Thursday at 4 would be fine for me I’ll be able to put a little bit more work in into it next week and but yeah I mean like I do think that like uh a lot of the the meeting is a function of how much time I can dedicate to like moving forward in in communicating a conception of how the mechanisms work so again any any help on that would be would be greatly appreciated great thanks everybody thank you thank you guys
(1:23:47) [Music] byebye [Music]